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The paper examines the impact of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on the survival of
business start-ups. FDI has potential for both negative displacement/competition effects as
well as positive knowledge spillover and linkage effects on new ventures. We find a net
positive effect for the whole dataset. However, a major contribution of the paper is to
outline and test an argument that this effect is likely to be comprised of a net negative
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11 Introduction
There has recently been much interest by policy makers into the potential effects of
globalisation on developed and developing economies. Of all the drivers of globalisation -
trade, migration of workers, and foreign direct investment (FDI) - the last is probably the
most visible. It is also likely to be, at the margin, the most important aspect of globalisation
in economic terms. For instance, over the last decades global FDI flows have grown at
least twice as fast as trade, now well exceeding $500 billion and resulting in a total stock of
more than $8 trillion (United Nations, 2004). It is, therefore, not surprising that a lot of
academic research has been directed towards investigating the potential impact of FDI and
multinationals (MNEs) on economic development of host countries.
Much of the academic work has focussed on the question of detecting “productivity
spillovers” from multinationals, i.e., whether or not domestic firms increase their
productivity through learning and competition from MNEs. Recent examples include
Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Girma et al. (2001) who examine spillovers in Venezuela
and the United Kingdom, respectively. Related work has examined the macroeconomic
link between FDI and growth in cross-country growth regressions (Borensztein et al., 1998;
Alfaro et al., 2004) as well as the potential wage effects of multinationals in the domestic
economy (Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2004; Girma and Görg, 2007).
What has been largely neglected in this literature is an analysis of the link between
multinational enterprises and the survival of plants or firms in the host country. This is an
important topic, however, not only because plant survival shapes the competitive landscape
of the economy, but also because the persistence of jobs is linked to the survival of plants.
Both of these issues can be expected to impact on welfare in the economy.
The aim of this paper is to examine the effect of inward FDI on the survival
expectations of incumbents in the host country. Theoretically, there are a number of
2possible effects. On the one hand, if inward FDI leads to technology spillovers then
incumbents may learn from multinationals, improve their productivity and subsequently
also their survival prospects in the market. FDI may provide linkage opportunities for new
ventures to sell products/services to foreign firms. On the other hand since FDI increases
competition in the domestic economy, multinationals may steal business from incumbents
and drive these out of the market. In this case, inward FDI will lead to reduced survival
probabilities for firms that are competing with multinationals in the host economy. We
investigate this issue empirically using data for new plant ventures from the UK Office of
National Statistics (ONS) comprising of the population of VAT registered businesses from
1997-2002. This data spans services as well as manufacturing industries.
The empirical evidence on the impact of FDI on firm survival is rather limited.
Bernard and Sjöholm (2003) and Görg and Strobl (2003a) examine whether there are
differences in survival probabilities between domestic and foreign owned firms and find
that affiliates of foreign multinationals are more likely to exit than domestic firms when
controlling for a number of plant and industry characteristics. These studies use plant level
data for Indonesia and Ireland, respectively.1 To our knowledge, there is only one paper
that investigated in detail the effect of inward FDI on survival of domestic incumbents by
Görg and Strobl (2003b). They use Irish plant level data to examine the effect of the
presence of multinationals on the survival of domestic plants and find that there are some
positive effects on domestic plants, in line with the idea that firms benefit from technology
spillovers from MNEs and are, thus, able to increase their survival prospects.
Our paper extends this literature by providing comprehensive evidence for the
United Kingdom, one of the major economies in Europe. Compared to the aforementioned
study by Görg and Strobl (2003b) which focuses on Ireland, our analysis of the UK not
1 Bernard and Jensen (2004) undertake a related study investigating differences in survival for domestic plants
and US multinationals in the US. They do not consider foreign multinationals in the US, however.
3only provides a much larger dataset but also a country with a relatively more developed
economy so that FDI might be expected to have greater potential for
displacement/competition effects with domestic enterprise in the same industry. By
contrast, in Ireland FDI often entailed the creation of new industry sectors in the economy.
Our data also have the important advantage that they cover services as well as
manufacturing, while the previous literature only used data for manufacturing. This is an
important improvement given the increasing importance of services in most industrialised
economies. This leads us to the first motivation for writing the paper which is to test for
the existence of a dominant influence of FDI on new firm survival.
Hypothesis 1. The net effect of FDI on the survival of new ventures is likely to be
comprised of positive knowledge spill over and linkage effects being offset against negative
competition effects.
Apart from data differences with earlier work, we also propose and test the
possibility that foreign ownership may have a distinctive impact on new venture
performance in static versus dynamic markets. Fotopoulos and Spence (1998) in discussing
inter-industry heterogeneity, distinguishing between static and dynamic markets and refer
to the drivers of this heterogeneity: time invariant differences in innovation and sunk costs.
They justify the application of turbulence measures (sum of entry and exit) by referring to a
wealth of papers all observing a positive correlation between firm entry and exit.2 As such,
turbulence should be an internally consistent measure as other studies have all noted a
positive correlation between entry and exit even when this relationship appears counter-
intuitive. Specifically, Dunne and Roberts (1991) find that high profits cause both high
industry entry as well as high exit from the industry.
2 Fotopoulos and Spence (1998) give a good review of papers which observe positive correlations between
firm entry and exit.
4The question we address is whether the empirical weight of the positive and
negative influences of FDI may be expected to vary between dynamic and static industries.
FDI usually entails introducing innovation to a recipient economy where the technology has
already been commercially successful in the overseas economy. Dynamic markets are
typically characterised by high rates of churn (firm entry plus exit relative to the stock of
firms) which tends to be higher at earlier stages of the diffusion of innovation in an industry
(Klepper, 1996). In these markets, new ventures are often innovative and have been shown
to be an important means through which new technology is introduced (Audretsch, 1995a,
and Geroski, 1995; Beesley and Hamilton, 1984). Similarly, in these markets consumer
demand and hence competitive advantage, depends much more on differences in
product/service characteristics than price (Agarwal and Bayus, 2002). By contrast lower
churn (more static) industries are associated with later stages of innovation diffusion where
commoditisation and price competition become more prevalent. Bhide (2000) shows that
new ventures are more likely to be imitative in low innovation industries. Therefore, if
both new ventures and foreign firms are more likely to be engaging in innovation in
dynamic industries, and if at the same time differences in innovation represent the focal
point for competition in such industries, then the relationship between foreign ownership
and new venture survival is more likely to be competitive – hence, a greater chance of
being negative. By contrast in static industries new ventures are more imitative and hence
have more scope to benefit from knowledge spillovers from foreign firms3.
3It is important to point out that dynamic/turbulent markets are not synonymous with high growth markets.
This is particularly true at very early stages of industry development when prior to the major growth phase
entry plus exit is often quite high relative to a very small stock of existing firms. Likewise, in declining
industries turbulence can be high when exiting large firms free up segments of the market which can provide
viable customer bases for small new entrants. If these exiting firms are mainly foreign firms then one might
expect a negative correlation between FDI and new venture survival. By contrast, if as is often the case FDI
in declining industries represents the most efficient international firms maximising their core competencies in
mature markets (often through the use of economies of scope which means diversifying into niches formally
occupied by small firms) then this is likely to pose a threat to new ventures thereby again generating a
negative effect from FDI on survival. Thus, even in declining turbulent/dynamic industries there are reasons
5Hypothesis 2. The net effect of FDI on new venture survival is more likely to be
negative in dynamic markets and positive in static markets.
The rest of the paper tests these hypotheses and is structured as follows. The source
and nature of the data is described in the next section. This followed in section 3 by a
discussion of the econometric methodology and motivation for the control variables. The
results are presented in section 4 and the paper then closes with conclusions.
2 Data
Our data is drawn from the Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR) database
at the UK Office for National Statistics.4 This register captures VAT registered businesses
and as such comprises about 98 percent of UK business activity.5 The advantage of using
data from the register is twofold. Firstly it is highly representative, given that it covers
almost the population of UK firms and does not suffer from biases induced by sampling.
This latter point is especially important in duration studies, where over-sampling of large
firms in comparison to small firms underestimates the real amount of movement in an
economy, since entry and exit is mostly a small firm phenomenon. Secondly, the register
identifies businesses at the local unit level. Barnes and Martin (2002) define this as the
“individual site or workplace (factory, shop etc.) at which activity takes place” (p. 37).
When extracting our data, we used the restriction that the data only include firms where the
local unit identifier (lowest aggregation level) was the same as the enterprise identifier
to believe that Hypothesis 2 might hold. Later, in the empirical analysis we also control for industry
growth/decline by including of a right hand side variable measuring industry sales growth/decline.
4 Access to this data is possible under controlled conditions on site at ONS offices.
5 See Barnes and Martin (2002) for an overview of this data and the ARD data referred to below.
6(higher aggregation level).6 This ensured that our data was comprised entirely of single
plant firms so exit implies firm as well as plant closure.7
However, representativeness and research relevance come at a cost so while the
IDBR contains a reasonably exhaustive listing of all firms from all sectors of the UK
economy, knowledge about the features of these firms is limited to sectoral and
employment information. To remedy this information shortfall, we import information at a
sectoral level on wages and market structure from the Annual Respondents Database
(ARD), which is essentially a subset of establishments in the IDBR. This lets us describe
the composition of the sector in which our firms operate and report, inter alia, industry
concentration ratios.
Our data extends for a 6 year period, 1997 to 2002.8 Focussing on this period is due
to one important reason: since 1997, the ARD data cover services as well as manufacturing
industries in the UK, while before that year only manufacturing data was available. We
analyse data from 1997 onwards. However, this translates into a relatively short year
survival horizon for the cohort of firms who appear in the data for the first time. Data for
1997 is essentially used as a criterion that allows us to identify new entrants (present in
1998 but not in 1997) and data for 2002 allows us to identify real, uncensored exits (present
in 2001 but not in 2002). Accordingly, we limit our duration analysis to a 3 year time
6 For example an enterprise with an enterprise identifier 122 could be composed of 2 local units with local
unit identifiers 133 and 144 respectively. When the local unit is a single plant firm, it is denoted by the same
identifier. In this example both the enterprise and local unit identifier would be 122.
7 It should be made clear that the data we use here from the Office of National Statistics has not been used in
any published analysis before. This data is not the more commonly known Annual Respondent’s Database
(ARD) Barnes and Martin (2002) which comprises a stratified sample of UK firms. We use the more
exhaustive Inter Departmental Business Register (IDBR) which covers all UK VAT registered businesses
which as of 2006 has been made more accessible to researcher via the new Business Structure Database.
8 We have had to limit our data to the 1998 cohort for two reasons. Firstly, there was no earlier data at the
Office for National Statistics on services. Secondly, we were size limitations using the IDBR data. There is
potential for future work to use multiple cohorts although this would necessitate longer panels, given the need
to identify and attribute the effects of macroeconomic shocks.
7window when we have accounted for left- and right-hand side censoring and represented
failures that arise in 1998 (entry year) as happening at the beginning of the following year.9
Fortunately, given the high level of attrition of start-ups in the earliest phases of
their operation (almost 50 percent of start-ups exited within these 3 years) even within a
relatively short time span we manage to capture a high level of early stage exits.10 This
pattern most likely arises from our ability to include low quality, under-capitalised, start-
ups when using the IDBR data. Given the comprehensive nature of the data, we are
confident that this data is representative.
Since our analysis focuses on exit from industry sectors, we first report exit levels
for the cohort of UK plants entering in 1998, tracking the number of exits from 1998 until
2001.11 Table 1 presents the development of industry level exit rates, calculated as number
of exiting firms in industry j relative to the total number of firms in the industry. The
average percentage of exits across all firms in the database is about 8 percent per year.12
This average is slightly higher in manufacturing than in services sector. Overall, this
suggests that only a minority of firms across the broad spectrum of UK industry exits in any
year. As such, dynamism at a sectoral level appears to happen at the fringes of industry in
general, and an examination of all industry exits suggests a high amount of inertia. Our
numbers compare well with UK data for 1974- 1979 compiled by Cable and Schwalbach
(1991) and quoted in Cable (1998). Cable and Schwalbach estimated entry to be 6.5
percent and exit to be slightly lower at 5.1 percent.
9 As is customary in survival analyses of this type with ‘simultaneous’ entry and exit.
10 Ideally, we would be able to identify the disappearance of a VAT registration number as a genuine closure
(failure) or alternatively merger in order to isolate mergers from our sample (See Persson, 2004). Owing to
the nature of our data, we opt for the convention of defining exit from the database as closure.
11 We cannot calculate the value of exits for 2002 because firm’s survival is right censored at this date.
12 This compares with an average of 6.5% found by Baldwin and Gorecki (1991) for Canadian manufacturing
industries. Dunne and Hughes (1994) report an average death rate of 20.5% in their UK data for 1975-85,
however, their data comprises only a sample of 2000 quoted and unquoted companies (mainly large) in the
UK financial and non-financial companies.
8[Table 1. near here]
This inertia seen across UK industry masks the dynamism that arises within cohorts
of new ventures, however. Accordingly, we would expect that annual exit rates within the
grouping of new ventures should be much higher, given the greater financial fragility and
unproven track-record of new ventures. Figures 1 and 2 trace the survival rates for our
1998 cohort of UK firms as a Kaplan-Meier function, according to whether foreign
penetration is high or low, for dynamic and static industries respectively. Our measure for
foreign penetration, ‘high_foreign’ is based on the percentage of employment in foreign
multinationals over total employment in the industry, and ‘high_foreign’ is defined as 1 if
this ratio exceeds the mean. Attrition is recorded for 3 analysis times and this corresponds
to 1999, 2000 and 2001 respectively.13 The accompanying Wilcox Log-rank test is also
given. We can see from both figures that almost 25 percent of entrants have died in the
year following entry, culminating in a rate of around 50 percent for the third year of
existence, an exit rate in line with others documented for UK manufacturing industries.14
We see from Figure 1 that firms entering dynamic industries with above average
rates of presence of foreign multinationals (‘high_foreign’ = 1) have lower survival
probabilities. This adverse effect of FDI in dynamic industries on new entrants is also
evidenced in the Log-rank test where expected failure is less than actual failure. In Figure 2
we observe that penetration by foreign firms is less injurious when the industry is classified
as static. We still witness higher firm failure rates when FDI rates are higher. However,
the disparity in survival rates between firms entering either high or low FDI industries is
13 A convention in duration analyses of this type is to treat all failures in the year of entry as having occurred
at the beginning of the next year. Accordingly all failure times for entry at time t are treated as failures arising
in t+1.
14 Our attrition rate for the 1998 cohort (1st three years), corresponds with other UK exit rates: 42 percent after
2 years cited by Scarpetta (2001) for the early 1990’s and 45 percent in Disney et al., (2003) for the period
1986 to 1991. However, note that these studies only relate to manufacturing industries.
9less marked. The accompanying Log-rank test which has a lower test statistic than that
seen for the previous figure, shows that the difference in survival rates is not so pronounced
for static industries as FDI varies.
[Figures 1 and 2 near here]
3 Modelling Plant Survival using a Hazard Function
Of course, the Kaplan-Meier survival function does not take account of the auxiliary
role of other covariates in influencing survival and hence is merely illustrative. It has been
established in the empirical IO literature that there are many factors that can possibly affect
plant survival. In order to properly disentangle the role of plant and industry specific
factors from that of the presence of MNCs on the survivability of plants we turn to a semi-
parametric modelling of plants’ hazard rates. We initially estimate a survival function in a
sample comprising all industries and then proceed to separate estimates for dynamic (high
firm churn) and static (low firm churn) industries.
Following the related empirical literature (for example, Audretsch and Mahmood,
1995, Mata and Portugal, 1994) we utilise a Cox proportional hazard model as our equation
to be estimated.15 The Cox proportional hazard model does not require any restrictive
assumptions regarding the baseline hazard, such as for instance a Weibull or lognormal
specification. This is appropriate for our purposes, as our main interest is not in the
estimation of the underlying baseline hazard but in the effect of the presence of MNCs on
plant survival. As pointed out in the literature on survival analysis, the semi-parametric
15 We used STATA version 9.2 for all estimations. The Cox Proportional Hazard model for the estimations
was invoked using the standard stcox procedure in STATA.
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modelling approach of the Cox proportional hazard model is advantageous if the parametric
form of the underlying baseline hazard function is not known with certainty.
The Cox proportional hazard model specifies the hazard function h(t) to be the
following:
)(
0 )()(
Xethth  (1)
where h(t) is the rate at which plants exit at time t given that they have survived in t-1, h0 is
the baseline hazard function (the parametric form of which is not specified) when all of the
covariates are set to zero, and X is a vector of plant and industry characteristics postulated
to impact on a plant’s hazard rate. The following covariates are included:
Size is the plant’s start up size in terms of employment and is included since it can
be considered a stylised fact that small plants generally have lower probabilities of survival
than large plants (for example, Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995; Mata and Portugal, 1994).
The premise is intuitive, larger plants are likely to have greater resources and hence be
better able to exploit market opportunities and fend off competition. Caves (1998) refers
to the gap between “fringe entry”, where a firm is undercapitalised at start-up, and the cost
of sustainable entry. The wider this gap, the higher is the probability that an
undercapitalised firm fails post entry.
C5 denotes the five firm concentration ratio of sector j, measured in terms of firms’
sales shares. Again, the expectation of the effect of market concentration on survival is not
clear-cut. Higher market concentration may lead to higher price-cost-margins in the
industry which, ceteris paribus, should increase a plant’s probability of survival. In
industries where firms compete more on innovation than price, the same point may hold
true if dominant firms have become X-inefficient (Leibenstein, 1966) and hence slack,
complacent or insufficiently vigilant in managing their innovation activities. However,
plants in highly concentrated markets may be subject to fierce aggressive behaviour by
11
dominant rivals with monopolistic power which may reduce chances of new venture
survival.
Growth is the net sectoral (sales) growth rate. Audretsch (1991) argues that
industry growth may elevate the price above the long-run average cost, i.e., increase firms’
price-cost-margin which would, all other things equal, affect survival rates positively. The
sectoral growth rate also allows us to control for other sector specific cyclical effects which
may impact on plant survival. However, in markets with emerging technologies with
underlying economies of scale (for example, network effects) the pressure for business
shakeouts only really emerges when the market has grown enough to allow economies of
scale effects to kick-in. In such circumstances, a rapidly growing market could have a
negative effect on new venture survival. Thus, overall we have ambiguous priors about the
actual empirical relationship between industry growth and plant survival.
We furthermore include a measure of production cost, namely the median wage in
the industry as an explanatory variable. The expectation is that higher costs, all other
things being equal, reduce profitability and, hence survival prospects.
Most importantly from our point of view, foreign presence is a proxy for the
presence of multinationals in a sector and is defined as the share of employment by MNCs
in sector j at time t. This variable is supposed to capture the effects of multinationals on
firm survival. If positive spillover or linkage effects occur, the presence of MNCs should
have a positive effect on firm survival. If the competition effect is prevalent, we would
expect a negative effect on firm survival. We also test to see whether the dominance of
either effect varies as we move from a static to a dynamic industry. This is motivated by
the aforementioned body of empirical research which indicates key differences between
static and dynamic industries in terms of the importance of innovation as the focal point of
competition and the extent to which new ventures engage in innovation. Thus, the degree
12
to which net displacement effects (from innovative foreign firms to domestic enterprise)
exist or vary between dynamic and static industries is a core motivation in this analysis.
All sector specific variables are calculated at the 3 digit SIC 92 level. Table 2
provides some summary statistics on the included variables. Contrary to what we expect,
when we report the summary statistics independently for dynamic and static industries,
dynamic industries exhibit a higher foreign presence (which is what we expect) but also
lower average industry growth than static industries. Our key variable measuring the
importance of foreign multinationals for all firms, foreign presence, shows a mean value of
about 14 percent. This proportion of foreign sectoral FDI shows some variation, rising to
over 15 percent for dynamic industries and falling to just over 13 percent for static
industries.16
[Table 2 near here]
Table 3 shows the breakdown in entry and exit rates for selected industry subsectors. The
exit statistics are particularly interesting with high attrition rates for Clothing (18),
Electronic devices (33), Construction (45), Car sales (50) and Real Estate (70). Overall
failure is high for the 3 year period, with generally the highest failure arising early on
(failure rates tail off significantly in the third year).
[Table 3 near here]
4. Results
The results of estimating different variations of the hazard model described in
equation (1) using data for the total sample are presented in Table 4. All estimations are
stratified by two digit industry, which allows for equal coefficients of the covariates across
16 The appendix includes a correlation table for these variables.
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strata (sectors), but baseline hazards unique to each stratum (sector). As can be seen, the
Wald tests provide satisfactory support for our model specifications. In interpreting the
results one should recall that our dependent variable is the hazard rate, i.e., a negative
coefficient on an independent variable implies that it reduces the rate of hazard, thus
increasing chances of survival, all other things equal.
[Table 4 near here]
Overall we have about half a million observations for our Cox regressions,
corresponding to approximately 179,000 firms of which 77,000 fail during the 3 year
observation window.
The significance and sign of the control variables are fairly familiar. In column (1)
we see that Industry Growth promotes new venture survival which is consistent with a view
that faster growing industries provide better revenue opportunities for new ventures.
Column (2) outlines the results for the sample when we include the 5-firm concentration
ratio. The 5 firm concentration ratio variable has a significant effect in reducing new firm
survival as one would expect if new firms are vulnerable to large incumbents with
monopolistic power. 17
Column (3) gives the results for our pooled survival analysis when we include our
measure of foreign firm penetration in the 3-digit sector. Our results suggest that an
increase in the importance of foreign owned firms in the sector has a positive effect on firm
survival, i.e., lowers the hazard of exiting. Although we report the results for Z-values, the
corresponding hazard rates for foreign presence and C5 are 0.996 and 1.0002 respectively.
This suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in foreign presence leads to a reduction in
the hazard rate by 4 percent i.e. ( (1-0.996) * 10 = 0.04 ). In other words there is a 4
percent reduction in the conditional probability of exiting. The effect of foreign firms in
17 We originally included a variable measuring Minimum Efficient Scale (MES), median industry wages and
the Coefficient of Variation (CV). However, collinearity between our concentration measure C5 and MES
made it redundant. Also the CV was highly collinear with our measure for FDI.
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the 3-digit sector, is greater than the effect of the concentration ratio in terms of its
economic significance. For the 5-firm concentration ratio (C5), the hazard rate for the
model in column 3 suggests that an increase in C5 by 10 percent leads to an increase in the
hazard rate by (0.0002 * 10 =) 0.2 percent. Hence, the effect of foreign presence on hazard
rates is non-trivial.
In column (4) we include an additional covariate, the Coefficient of Variation
calculated for the size variable on the intuition that we need to account for the possibility
that different sized firms co-exist when industry cost curves are L-shaped (Baldwin, 1998:
Caves and Porter, 1980).18 A significantly negative sign for the Coefficient of Variation
variable indicates that greater size diversity helps survival. This makes sense when we
consider that minimum efficient scale can occur at relatively low output levels, allowing
new entrants to survive despite their smaller size relative to incumbents. It is also notable
that the inclusion of this variable does not change our result on the effect of FDI on
survival.
In column (5) we interact the foreign presence variable with the C5 in order to
examine whether the effect of multinationals differs according to the level of industry
concentration. The reason we test for this influence is to assess whether the negative
competition effect and the positive spillover and linkages effects from foreign ownership
vary by industry concentration. FDI is usually undertaken by large foreign firms and hence
may be more of a threat to the dominant firms in an industry. In a highly concentrated
industry new ventures are less likely to be peripheral fringe firms and hence more
influenced by the dominant form of competition occurring in the market. However, we do
not find a statistically significant effect of the interaction terms in this model.
18 This variable was calculated as Cv = σ/μ where σ is the size standard deviation for the 3-digit sector and μ
the average size.
15
[Table 5 near here]
In Table 5 we split the sample into dynamic and static industries. We define a
dummy variable equal to one if an industry is dynamic. It is defined as such if entry and
exit rates combined equal or exceed 20 percent of the stock of firms. This corresponds to
the 75th percentile of the distribution of aggregate entry and exit rates.19 In line with our
intuition that there is higher firm attrition in a dynamic compared to a static industry, we
see that approximately 44 percent of start-ups in the dynamic industry (26,878/ 61,720)
failed during the 3 year observation period. The figure for failure in static industries was 33
percent (50,206 / 151,367).
Our results highlight some stark differences in terms of the role of foreign
ownership in the survival function of new ventures in dynamic and static industries.
Consistent with what we saw earlier in the Kaplan-Meier figures and accompanying Wilcox
statistics, foreign ownership exerts a negative influence on new plant survival in dynamic
industries (Table 5, columns 3 and 5). The net effect of FDI in static industries is less clear
cut (Table 5, columns 8 and 10). In static industries the effect of FDI on new venture
survival is moderated by the level of concentration in the industry. The finding indicates
that the combined positive influence of knowledge spillovers and linkages is outweighed by
negative competition effects in dynamic industries. This finding is consistent with a view
suggested by the aforementioned evidence in the existing IO empirical literature that in
dynamic industries both new ventures and foreign firms are more likely to be direct
competitors.
19 We tested whether the sample split is appropriate. We interacted the dummy with all independent variables
and ran a regression including all interaction terms on the full sample. A Wald test did not allow us to reject
the hypothesis of joint statistical significance of all interaction terms and, hence, splitting the sample is
appropriate.
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In static industries, we find the opposite result with a net positive effect from
foreign ownership on new venture survival. However, this operates through the C5 and
foreign ownership interaction variable (Column 10). This indicates that negative
competition effects are more likely to be overpowered by positive spillover and linkages
effects when industry concentration is high.20 This evidence supports the view that FDI is
usually undertaken by large foreign firms and hence may be more a threat to the dominant
firms in an industry. Thus, small new ventures do not appear to face the brunt of most of
this negative competition effect leaving them to experience more of the positive linkage and
spillover effects.
Combining the results of tables 4 and 5, our findings indicate that in general foreign
ownership promotes the survival of new ventures – this effect being strongest in highly
concentrated static industries – but that in dynamic markets the opposite is true and that
foreign ownership has a net negative displacement effect. From a policy perspective, one
may be tempted to take the broad conclusion that since the pooled results show FDI reduces
the hazard rate for new entrants, that in general FDI is a good thing for indigenous
enterprise. However, if one distinguishes between the quantity and quality of
entrepreneurship (Burke et al, 2000) then a different possibility emerges. If new ventures
are more innovative in dynamic industries and more imitative in static industries then a net
negative displacement effect in dynamic industries is concerning because it indicates
damage is concentrated on more high quality new ventures. Thus, it is possible that a net
positive effect on quantity – as is apparent from the results in Table 4 – may mask a net
negative impact on quality which seems plausible from the results in Table 5. Our data set
is not rich enough to progress this line of thought but the results are enough to raise it as an
issue for further research. However, we have determined that the interaction between
20 From Table 2, the mean C5 for static industries in 1.86, hence the effect of FDI on the hazard rate for the
mean industry is negative.
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foreign ownership and new ventures survival is markedly different, in fact opposite,
between dynamic and static markets. In terms of industrial policy, it implies a common
desire to encourage FDI while simultaneously building up a long term supply of indigenous
enterprise is more challenging in dynamic markets where a trade-off in terms of these
objectives appears to exist – at least in the short run.
In terms of the control variables, we find the adverse effect from industry
concentration in inducing higher firm failure (raising the hazard rate), in Table 4 appears in
Table 5 to be more pronounced in static markets i.e. coefficients are higher. This result is
consistent with a view that new ventures are more imitative in static markets and hence
more vulnerable to monopolistic power of dominant incumbents. In dynamic markets,
more innovative new ventures are able to differentiate themselves and so to some extent be
shielded from this effect. Start-up size has a positive influence on firm survival in static
industries but an insignificant effect in dynamic industries. The former result is consistent
with the IO literature while the latter may reflect staged financing and the need for
flexibility in dynamic, hence more uncertain/risky, industries. Bhide (2000) discusses how
new ventures in innovative uncertain/risky industries adopt a pilot (small scale) launch to
enable a trial an error deployment of available resources (e.g. staged financing) rather than
drawing on all available resources at the time of start-up. This strategy is perfectly rational
based on managing risks by hedging bets – in this case drawing down available funding to
use in a new venture. In this manner, smaller size start-up may not be a handicap as such
firms may be able to draw on more resources (finance) to prolong the venture if the things
do not go to plan – unlike a venture who has put all its ‘eggs in one basket’ by backing one
single strategy which was decided prior to start-up and before the firm has had real market
feedback.
18
Industry growth has a negative influence on survival in dynamic markets which is
consistent with IO theory on business shakeouts – industry growth enables economies of
scale effects to kick-in and hence push out smaller new ventures. In line with this thread,
static industries would normally have matured beyond the business shakeout phase and so
this effect may not be expected to influential.
5. Conclusion.
The paper set out to examine the impact of foreign ownership on the survival of
new ventures. The question is interesting because it has yet to be established at an empirical
level whether the influence is positive, negative or neutral. In addition, this line of research
has relevance to policy given that encouraging FDI and enterprise creation are cornerstones
of most industrial policy. Therefore, it is interesting to assess whether these influences
complement or counteract each other. Foreign firms are generally viewed as having
potential for both negative displacement/competition effect as well as positive knowledge
spillover and linkage effects on new ventures. Thus, the paper tests the net effect which it
finds to be positive for the whole dataset. This supports hypothesis 1 which indicates the
existence of an impact of FDI on new venture survival.
The paper then proposes hypothesis 2 which outlines reasons why this net effect is
unlikely to be homogenous across all types of industries. It argues that the direction of
these effects is particularly likely to vary between dynamic and static markets. It then
proceeds to separate the data into these two types of industries and separately estimates a
new venture survival equation in each case. The direction of the net effect is found to
change in line with hypothesis 2 (itself motivated by the current industrial economics
literature on new venture survival). We find that negative competition/displacement effects
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dominate in dynamic markets while positive knowledge spillover and linkage effects
dominate in static industries.
The results indicate a challenge for industrial policy in dynamic markets in terms of
arriving at the right balance when trading off the direct positive effect of FDI against the
negative indirect effect on the survival of new ventures. This trade-off will be influenced
by the extent to which policy makers discount future benefits and costs as the negative
influence on new firm survival is likely to be small in current economic terms but could be
potentially enormous over a longer term horizon if a ‘promising start-up’ that was
otherwise destined for success is snuffed out of its fledgling existence before it had a
chance to develop competitive resilience. This raises an issue for further research and this
would also need to consider the capacity for employees of foreign owned firms to
subsequently leave with high value knowledge gleaned from their former employer and set
up their own ventures (Burke and To, 2001). Potentially, this may lead to a future stock of
high capability ventures that may perform better than those displaced by FDI.21
Apart from the effects of foreign ownership the results also indicated that the
influence of industry growth, firm start-up size and the level of concentration all have
different (usually opposite) effects in dynamic compared to static industries. These
differences are consistent with the views that the focal point of competition in terms of
price versus innovation, and the main adversaries in terms of small v. large or small v. small
alongside large v. large, are likely to vary between static and dynamic markets. Thus, our
paper takes a small step for the empirical IO literature to account for a general conclusion
emanating from the theoretical IO literature, namely that small differences between
industries can lead to large differences in terms of the nature and impact of competition.
21 The possibility for researchers to apply the new Business Structure Database at the UK Office for National
Statistics, a formatted version of the IDBR data which we used in our analysis, makes replications of and
extensions to our work a real possibility.
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Table 1: Mean Exit Rates by Year (standard deviation in parentheses)
Year All sectors Manufacturing Services
1998 0.078 0.086 0.078
(0.052) (0.057) (0.053)
1999 0.088 0.094 0.088
(0.060) (0.057) (0.060)
2000 0.088 0.092 0.087
(0.059) (0.059) (0.060)
2001 0.081 0.083 0.081
(0.059) (0.052) (0.059)
Source: own calculations based on ONS data
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
All industries Dynamic industries Static industries
Means Standard
Deviations
Means Standard
Deviations
Means Standard
Deviations
C5 4.42 7.77 6.7 8.1 1.86 2.89
Foreign
presence
14.17 10.43 15.6 12.1 13.5 9.622
Industry
growth
16.11 122.17 14.8 206.5 16.95 35.7
Start up size 5.74 48.97 6.9 65.4 4.16 25.5
Source: own calculations based on ONS data
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Table 3: Breakdown of data for selected sectors
Entry rate for 1998
cohort as % UK
firms
Exit rate as % of 1998 cohort
starts
% exiting each year
No. mean std.
dev.
Exits survivors Overall
percentage
that fail
1999 2000 2001
Manufacture of Food (15) 823 12.2 2.2 281 507 36% 15% 12% 8%
Textiles (17) 611 11.3 3.4 235 383 38% 16% 12% 9%
Clothing (18) 1300 17.9 1 484 606 44% 20% 14% 10%
Footwear (19) 116 10.8 2.7 46 71 39% 18% 11% 10%
Timber products (20) 802 11 3 262 576 31% 12% 11% 8%
Publishing (22) 3879 14.9 6.1 1458 2684 35% 15% 12% 9%
Rubbers and plastics (25) 660 9.7 1.8 212 455 32% 13% 11% 8%
Glass and ceramics (26) 626 14.2 2.7 224 422 35% 17% 12% 6%
Iron and steel (27) 247 10.2 2.3 84 153 35% 13% 16% 7%
Metal products (28) 2717 9.4 1.2 904 1991 31% 13% 10% 8%
Machinery (29) 1039 8 1.7 404 770 34% 12% 12% 10%
Electrical equip. (31) 513 10 2.4 198 366 35% 14% 12% 10%
Radio and TV equip. (32) 298 10.3 0.5 136 200 40% 16% 13% 11%
Electronic and optical devices (33) 405 7.3 1.3 258 272 49% 20% 15% 13%
Motor vehicles (34) 291 11.3 1.1 116 195 37% 17% 12% 9%
Other transport equip. (35) 304 12.1 3.2 117 193 38% 16% 12% 10%
Furniture (36) 2749 15.8 3.7 961 1881 34% 15% 11% 8%
Electricity (40) 56 31.1 2.1 82 112 42% 20% 13% 9%
Construction (45) 22940 0.25 2 22 30 42% 23% 10% 10%
Vehicle retail (50) 7400 11.3 3 12976 13517 49% 21% 15% 13%
Other wholesale (51) 14638 13.3 3.2 2526 4880 34% 15% 12% 8%
Transport (60) 5153 0.1 1.4 5656 9061 38% 18% 13% 8%
Other transport (61) 172 15.2 2.4 1946 3341 37% 17% 13% 7%
Air transport (62) 184 22 3.5 51 107 32% 17% 7% 8%
Travel agents (63) 1914 14.2 5.5 59 117 34% 18% 9% 7%
Post (64) 3456 33.6 1.5 769 1219 39% 18% 12% 9%
Real estate (70) 7825 15 5.7 1108 977 53% 15% 21% 17%
Rental (71) 2396 20.4 4.3 2411 5890 29% 12% 9% 8%
Consultancy (72) 30009 2.3 7.5 12577 22509 36% 13% 13% 10%
R&D (73) 270 10.1 0.35 97 198 33% 15% 8% 10%
Professional (74) 41684 3.6 8.8 14321 26856 35% 14% 12% 9%
Education (80) 5490 35.7 8.5 1846 3821 33% 14% 11% 7%
Nursing (85) 7614 24.8 7.5 2523 5431 32% 11% 13% 8%
Cinemas (92) 8631 9.8 9.2 3038 6153 33% 14% 11% 8%
Notes:
For reasons of data confidentiality, some sectors were not reported where there was a risk of individual firms being
identified.
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Table 4: Hazard function for all industries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
startup size 0.44 -0.62 -0.65 -0.76 -0.62
(8.9E-5) (8.4E-5) (8.5E-5) (8.6E-5) (8.4E-5)
3-digit industry growth -4.78*** -2.23** -2.45*** -4.11*** -2.49***
(1.2E-4) (1.2E-4) (1.2E-4) (1.4E-4) (1.2E-4)
C5 18.93*** 19.62*** 19.83*** 11.61***
(8.4E-6) (8.4E-6) (9.04E-06) (1.3E-5)
Coefficient of size variation -4.26***
(3.4e-3)
foreign presence in 3-digit industry -4.72*** -3.37*** -4.73***
(6.1E-4) (6.3E-4) (7.2E-4)
foreign presence * C5 1.37
(4.66E-07)
Number of observations 543,263 541,785 541,742 541,742 541,742
Number of firms 179,311 179,008 178,998 178,998 178,998
Number of failures 77,084 76,783 76,774 76,774 76,774
Wald test statistic 23.10 384.33 414.20 435.70 415.92
Wald test (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Notes:
(a) Heteroskedasticity consistent standard error in parentheses. Z-values reported where negative value implies a
reduction in death hazard i.e. an increase in survival
(b) *** , ** and * imply Z-value significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively.
(c) baseline hazard stratified by sector
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Table 5: Industry dynamism differences
Dynamic industry Static industry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
startup size 1.51 1.51 1.53 1.53 1.55 -2.67*** -2.99*** -2.98*** -2.92*** -2.97***
(9.3E-5) (9.1E-5) (9.1E-5) (9.2E-5) (9.0E-5) (3.2E-4) (3.0E-4) (3.0E-4) (3.1E-4) (3.1E-4)
3-digit industry growth 4.53*** 4.71*** 4.56*** 3.46*** 4.59*** -1.50 0.15 -0.16 3.16*** -0.54
(1.8E-4) (1.8E-4) (1.8E-4) (1.8E-4) (1.8E-4) (1.6E-4) (1.7E-4) (1.7E-4) (3.1E-4) (1.8E-4)
C5 4.25*** 2.95*** 5.23*** 1.26 6.33*** 6.34*** 5.02*** 9.98***
(1.1E-5) (1.1E-5) (1.3E-5) (1.7E-5) (2.4E-5) (2.4E-5) (2.5E-5) (4.2E-5)
Coefficient of Variation -4.76*** 3.94***
(5.1E-3) (7.4E-3)
foreign presence in 3-digit industry 4.94*** 5.92*** 3.16*** -0.96 -0.81 3.02***
(8.0E-4) (8.2E-4) (1.0E-3) (1.1E-3) (1.1E-3) (1.3E-3)
foreign presence * C5 1.02 -6.71***
(6.0E-7) (2.2E-6)
Number of observations 139,243 137,765 137,730 137,730 137,730 404,020 404,020 404,012 404,012 404,012
Number of firms 61,720 61,402 61,393 61,393 61,393 151,367 151,367 151,362 151,362 151,362
Number of failures 26,878 26,577 26,569 26,569 26,569 50,206 50,206 50,205 50,205 50,205
Wald test statistic 22.77 41.07 66.29 90.83 67.87 9.34 49.6 50.37 65.82 113.89
Wald test (p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Notes:
(a) Heteroskedasticity consistent standard error in parentheses. Z-values reported where negative value implies a reduction in death hazard i.e. an increase in survival
(b) *** , ** and * imply Z-value significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively.
(c) baseline hazard stratified by sector
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Figure 1: Survival with foreign firm penetration in dynamic markets
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Figure 2: Survival with penetration from foreign firms in static markets
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Appendix: Correlation table
Startup
size
c5 Industry
growth
Median
wage
MES Foreign
presence
Exit
rate
Startup size 1.0000
c5 0.0959* 1.0000
Industry
growth
-0.0053* 0.0001 1.0000
Median wage 0.2441* 0.4082* -0.0234* 1.0000
MES -0.0088* -0.0210* -0.0043* -0.0751* 1.0000
Foreign
presence
0.0133* 0.1841* 0.0161* 0.0536* -0.1689* 1.0000
Exit rate 0.0489* 0.4734* -0.0126* 0.2858* -0.2051* 0.1386* 1.0000
